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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the alternatives available for
long term project financing in the United Kingdom.
Historical investment trends of the major capital suppliers
are examined and assimilated to the trends and economic
conditions currently confronting the UK property market.
Equity financing techniques are reviewed, and the much
discussed unitization of property is critically examined.
Although at the time of this writing the unitization
concepts as put forth by the Royal Institute of Chartered
Surveyors and Richard Ellis were not yet tested in the
marketplace, they did receive preliminary approval from
Parliament and appeared well on their way to implementation.
Debt alternatives and methods for enhancing the
attractiveness of a debt offering are discussed. It is
concluded that given the current level of interest rates and
property yields in the UK, debt is the favored funding
vehicle for the major suppliers of capital, and should be
addressed as such by the developer.
Thesis Supervisor: William Wheaton
Title: Associate Professor
Department of Urban Studies and Planning.
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I. Background on the Property Investment Market.
Before investigating the current UK property market, it
is useful to understand how the market as it exists today
evolved. A historical perspective will provide insights into
the decision criteria that have guided the market players in
the past. These guidelines can then be evaluated in terms
of their applicability in todays environment, and all useful
criteria can form the basis for assumptions about future
behavior.
The UK property investment market traces its origins
back to the end of World War II. Prior to this time, most
commercial and industrial property was owner-occupied, and
investors were generally uninterested in property as an
investment vehicle. But during the war, 9.5 million sf of
office space in central London was destroyed by bombing.1
The significant decrease in space was coupled by a dramatic
increase in occupational demand after the war. As produc-
tivity rose in the postwar period, office space requirements
increased. This increase was highlighted by the economy's
shift from a manufacturing base to the office-oriented ser-
vice sector.
As a result of increasing demand for space with little
.Fraser.
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existing or new supply, rental and capital values escalated.
Further development to loosen the supply squeeze was
restricted, however, by both the construction industry's
insufficient resources to handle the added space require-
ments, as well as by the Labour government's imposition of
100% tax on the development value of land.1 The latter was
not removed until 1953, which provided the impetus for mas-
sive redevelopment in the mid 50's.
At the beginning of this boom, property development was
virtually a riskless venture. Demand was still high for
office space, so there was little risk of vacancy upon
completion. Construction costs were contained by fixed bids.
Development financing was available through financial
institutions, and long term mortgages were offered by the
insurance companies at low fixed rates. Projects were self-
financing, but all gains in rental and capital values were
passed on to the developer.
In this profitable environment, it wasn't long before
competition increased, financial resources became tight, and
the stock of available space rose, thereby increasing the risk
of vacancy. However, the Labour government once again moved
to restrict development by passing the Control of Office and
Industrial Development Act in 1965, or the "Brown Ban" named
1 Fraser.
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after the responsible parliamentary minister. The act
virtually banned further office development in London, which
turned out to be a blessing to those developers with
partially or fully completed buildings because it restricted
supply in a market with strong demand. The Brown Ban
essentially laid the groundwork for rising rental values.
It was at this time that pension funds and life insur-
ance companies turned from indirect funding of development
through lending activity to direct investing by way of pur-
chasing property. The Control Act of 1965 reduced the
opportunities to finance development indirectly through
mortgage loans. But the institutions were also becoming
increasingly aware of the sensitivity of the stock markets,
as the Financial Times All Share Index dropped 11% between
1968 and 1970 while the JLW Property Index increased 30%
during the period.1 (See Appendix C for information on
property indices.) Direct property investment allowed the
institutions to diversify their portfolios and was viewed as
a strong hedge against inflation, which was steadily climb-
ing in the early 1970's, as shown in Exhibit A.' Further-
more, the long term nature of property investments was
appealing because it matched the term of the institutions'
liabilities. Despite the development controls, attractive
investments were available as rising property values made
1 Jones, Lang, Wooton.
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tenancy more cost effective than ownership. Eager to fund
the market, the pension fund and life insurance companies
with large cash balances were willing to buy occuppied prop-
erties and lease them back to the tenants. As a result of
this buying activity, property investments by the funds and
insurance companies increased over 90% in real terms during
the late 50's.1
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New property development came on strong again in the
early 70's, when the Conservative government made cheap
credit available in an effort to stimulate the industrial
base of the economy. The Competition and Credit Control
(CCC) agreement introduced in 1971 reduced the bank rate to
5%, abolished bank lending ceilings, and defined new rules
1 Richard Ellis.
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for bank liquidity which allowed for greater lending.1 The
monetary expansion brought on strong demand for office
accommodation particularly from the financial services sec-
tor. In addition, consumer borrowing and spending rose,
bringing with it rising demand for retail space. The growing
occupational demand coupled with the strong investment
demand from funds and insurance companies caused rental and
capital values to escalate. At the same time, the govern-
ment eased the development controls imposed by the Brown
Ban, which opened the door for new projects. With cheap
money available, high space demand, and relaxed controls,
prospects were good for most commercial and industrial pro-
jects. New construction orders rose 12% between 1972 and
1973.2 And although cheap money reduced the supply of
attractive leaseback arrangements, some pensions and insur-
ance companies partook in the boom by acquiring property
companies.
While occupational demand rose during this period,
unemployment increased from 2.5% to 3.9% between 1970 and
1972.3 This mismatch between growth in demand for space and
unemployment can partially be explained by the influx of
foreign finance-related concerns. The emergence of the
1 Fraser.
2 Department of the Environment.
3 Central Statistical Office.
-9-
Eurodollar market in the mid 1960's and the growth of inter-
national money markets served to promote London as a major
financial center. Foreign banks were attracted to the City
and greatly impacted space demands, but their many expatri-
ate employees did not boost the UK unemployment statistics.
The CCC also brought with it a massive influx of depo-
sits, which allowed the banks to significantly expand their
lending base. With rising capital values, property was
attractive collateral to the bankers, who were often willing
to lend on a variable rate basis 100% of development costs.
Limits on borrowings were eased in favor of high expecta-
tions about future growth. Total bank advances to property
companies soared from L450m in 1971 to over L2800m
at the end of 1974.1
Development companies were virtually unrestricted in the
amount of debt they could accumulate because the banks did
not encourage positive or even breakeven cash flows on the
mortgaged properties. If the cash flow from the property
did not satisfy monthly mortgage payments, some banks would
simply roll over the interest and apply the deficit to the
outstanding balance. This practice was essentially specu-
lating on the rising value of the property. Without cash
flow restrictions, the only limit on borrowing by developers
1 Financial Statistics.
was their collateral. As the value of their collateral
increased, they borrowed more and continued buying, which in
turn further increased the value of their property. While
property values increased an'average of 10% annually between
1967 - 1970, during the next three years they increased 26%
per year on average. 1 The property boom was snowballing, but
was soon to come to the bottom of its mountain.
The government became increasing sensitive toward
the development industry. They viewed property as the main
beneficiary of policies which were designed to stimulate the
industrial sector. The industrial sector, however, was
suffering from rising imports and labor unrest. Public
anger escalated as developers' profits mounted while housing
demands remained unattended. In 1973, the government
responded by freezing rents, taxing development gains, and
tightening credit.2 Virtually overnight, the expected appre-
ciation in property values against which millions had been
borrowed disappeared. Both the developer and the lender were
caught in rather serious dire straits. One major bank with
a large portfolio of property loans, London & County Securi-
ties, announced liquidity problems because depositors were
not renewing their money markets, a main source of funds for
the bank. A run on secondary banks ensued, as it was the
1 Financial Statistics.
2 Fraser.
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smaller banks who held the majority of property loans.1
Without the intervention of the Bank of England, many banks
certainly would have failed.
Interest rates soared from 6.21% in 1972 to 12.17% in
1974, and property companies were forced to sell off prop-
erty assets to meet rising debt payments. Property values
fell dramatically as more and more property was put on the
sale bench. But even as property became cheaper, without
rental growth it was an unattractive investment. The pension
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funds and life insurance companies were the main potential
purchasers, but with high interest rates, they could get a
1 Fraser.
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better yield in the short term money markets. And with the
prospect of falling values, these institutions were not
interested in the buying. Many of them already had large
commitments outstanding. In this environment of falling val-
ues and high interest rates, developers simply could not
afford to build, and virtually new orders for commercial and
industrial space dropped 47% between 1973 and 1975, as shown
in Exhibit B.
The market started to revive again in 1975, when the new
Labour government removed the rent freeze and interest rates
started to fall. Property companies were still trying to
dispose of some of their assets, but the pension funds and
insurance companies with new investment confidence were
ready to buy. Prime investments were available at low
prices, and rents were certain to rise, as there were no new
developments coming to market and the economy seemed to be
taking a turn for the better with falling inflation. But the
pension fund's and insurance companies' appetite for prop-
erty could not be satiated by the stock of completed build-
ings. High investment demand for property pushed prices up
to the point were investment returns on completed buildings
were unacceptable. In an effort to obtain higher returns,
the institutions turned to development. However, with
little internal expertise in development, these institutions
relied on the property trading companies to supply them with
projects for which the institutions could provide the capi-
-13-
tal. To minimize the risk in the project for the institu-
tion, and to boost the developer's profit, the latter would
typically guarantee rental upon completion. But in the
strong rental market of the late 70's, this guarantee was
rarely exercised.
At the same time, banks became reluctant lenders in the
property market. The Bank of England expanded its
supervisory role over the lending practices of the financial
institutions, particularly the secondary banks. But after
being stung badly, many were voluntarily avoiding property
loans.
Investment by the pension funds and life assurance
companies, therefore, was the backbone of development after
the property crash of the 70's. It is useful to determine
have large institutional investors funded the new develop-
ments in the past, ie through equity in a project or through
lending activity to the developers. Exhibit C plots the
percentage of commercial and industrial construction acti-
vity funded by way of pension fund and life insurance equity
capital. Since there is typically a 2 year time lag between
the time when the funding commitment is made and when it is
actually fulfilled, the curve should be shifted to the left
two periods to determine what influenced the decision to
fund new projects with equity capital.
-14-
EXHIBIT C
% Equity in New Devel copme nts
17 -
14-
13 -
102
9 .
S
-1
1979 190 181 192 198 19E4 198;5
a *4 Eql-y INew Dev 4. NMirl B3i RPate- F eil ame: Rate
With a shifted curve, the percentage of equity committed
to new projects increases steadily between 1977 and 1980,
and drops from 1981 through 1983. Turning to Exhibit D,
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which measures comparative performance between gilts, equi-
ties, and property, it can be seen that during the earlier
period, property returns outperformed the other investment
media. In the later period, property returns were signifi-
cantly lower than gilts or equities. It can be concluded
that when property has higher relative returns than alterna-
tive investments, equity funding will increase. While the
data source does not provide for a more extensive period of
review, this conclusion can logically be applied to any
period because when returns are strong, investor confidence
and expectations for property will be high. They are likely
to downplay the risks associated with equity investments in
property in favor of it's attractive returns. The advantage
of debt as a less risky investment may be outweighed by the
higher returns on equity, and development funding through
debt will decrease.
Note also that when the curve is shifted, it inversely
correlates to the movements in real interest rates. When
real interest rates were negative in 1980, equity funding
reached a peak. However, the percentage of new development
funded with debt increased as real rates started to rise.
The curve, then, illustrates the investment preferences of
the capital supplier in a market of insatiable demand. The
borrowing developer prefers to borrow when real rates are
low. But the capital - supplying investor is not satisfied
with returns on debt during periods of low or negative real
-16-
interest rates. Therefore, the lender prefers equity
instruments. The developer would have to resort to partner-
ships or shared equity schemes to obtain financing. Like-
wise, when real rates are high, the lender is attracted to
debt instruments. But the developer may have difficulty
servicing high - rate debt with a project's cash flow. Nev-
ertheless, in a market were demand for project financing
continuously exceeds the supply of funds available for prop-
erty investments, the supplier has strong leverage with his
demands. Real interest rates, therefore, are an important
factor in the type of funding available.
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Current Trends in the Property Investment Market
The property market entered another difficult period in
1982, a phase from which it is only starting to emerge. The
privatisation and decentralisation policies introduced by
the Tory government under Margaret Thatcher resulted in
large scale unemployment throughout the UK, as shown in
Exhibit E. Office rental growth rates reflected the drop in
employment, which after adjusting for inflation, dropped 7%
between 1981 and 1983.1
EXHIBIT E
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Unemployment has steadily increased since 1982, but the
total workforce has slightly expanded thus increasing space
1 Investors Chronicle/Hillier Parker.
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demand in the last year.1 The upcoming deregulation of the
financial markets has also boosted space demanded by foreign
companies much the way the introduction of the Eurodollar
market effected demand in the late 1960's and early 1970's.
Office space available for letting decreased by 3% in 1985,
due primarily to a 28.6% uptake in let space and only a 2.5%
increase in space placed on the market. The years floor-
space supply has also fallen to 2.2 years as shown in Exhi-
bit F, it's lowest level in four years. 2 This indicates a
EXHIBIT F
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tightening in the supply of space. However, as shown in
Exhibit B, new orders for construction have increased
1 Debenham, Tewson & Chinnocks.
2 Investors Chronicle/Hillier Parker.
-19-
steadily since 1982. Given that the time lag between
ordered and completed space is typically 1 to 2 years, the
supply of space placed on the market will also continue to
grow. Therefore, supply may not remain restricted in the
short term unless letting activity continues to outpace the
growth in space placed. With unemployment at record high
levels and the impact of foreign concerns on space demands
past it's peak, the future growth rate of let space is dubi-
ous.
Nevertheless, the achievement of record rents in the
London office market for modern facilities, as well as
strong retail sales growth, has positively effected rental
growth. However, tenants' requirements have become highly
discerning and much of the existing stock does not meet
their current needs. This outdating is reflected in the
investment patterns of the pension funds and life insurance
companies, whose sales of buildings rose 72% between 1982
and 1983.1 The selling activity of these major institutions
has resulted in a 2% inflation adjusted annualized fall in
capital values between 1980 and 1984. 2 The obsolescence of
buildings has, therefore, undermined any positive effects of
rental growth, with the net result of only a slight rise in
overall returns in the last year. 3
1 Debenham, Tewson & Chinnocks. 3 Ibid.
2 Richard Ellis.
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At the same time, gilts and particularly equities have
outperformed the property market in terms of overall
returns. (See Exhibit D). This has detracted institutional
funds away from property and into the alternative investment
vehicles. Furthermore, the introduction in 1982 of index-
Table 1 , Net Investment in UK Property by Pension Funds
and Life Insurance Companies
(Acquisitions - Sales)
Pension Funds & Real Terms
Insurance Companies (1980 Prices)
M) (LM)
1980 1796 1796
1981 1917 1714
1982 1856 1528
1983 1412 1111
1984 1418 1064
1985 1423 1005
Source: Richard Ellis
linked gilts, which offer a 3 1/2% guaranteed return over
inflation, has served to detract the inflation conscious
investor away from property. In real terms, investment in
property by the funds and insurance companies has fallen by
over 40% since 1980, as shown in Table 1. The rise in
-21-
construction output apparently has been funded by the
banks,whose loans to UK property companies increased from
2238 Lmillion in 1980 to 7076 Lmillion in 1985.1
While funding by the nonfinancial institutions has dec-
lined in real terms, the capital requirements for certain
schemes demanded by tenants have risen. In light of the
upcoming deregulation of the financial markets in October
1986, financial occupiers, by far the largest tenant group
in the City, are demanding larger, more sophisticated and
flexible facilities to accomodate new conglomerates and
their massive trading floors after the Big Bang.2 Advances
in communication technology have eased the priority of loca-
tion, but tenants now require modern buildings with 20,000
to 40,000sf floors, fewer interior columns, raised floors,
large floor to ceiling heights, and high power capacities
for computer facilities.3 The costs of these projects are
steadily climbing as evidenced by the 4m sf Broadgate pro-
ject worth over L2 billion, and the 10m sf Canary Wharf
development with a cost of Ll.7 billion. These schemes are
the more costly of today's projects, but they reflect the
trend toward larger and more costly office developments.
The emergence of out of town shopping centers has also
1 Richard Ellis. 3 Jones, Lang, Wooton.
2 Ibid.
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fostered larger capital requiring schemes. Increased mobil-
ity provided by the orbital motorway around the London has
made rural centers more accessible to consumers. With wages
rising faster than inflation since the early 1980's,
consumers have enjoyed greater purchasing power and have
spurred a buoyant retail sector. 1 Consumers are favoring
shopping centers with a wide range of retailers, where one-
stop shopping can be accomplished. These factors, in addi-
tion to the planning complexities of town center retail
development, have spurred demand for retail outlets outside
the traditional City shopping core. The amount of out-of-
town retail space, either under construction by March of
this year or with planning consent, was up by over 300% from
the same period last year, with the average size of the
schemes at 268,000sf.2 The regional mall, long an estab-
lished retail facility in the US, is coming of age in the
UK.
The costs of the major new development schemes,
therefore, are often beyond the financial capacity of a
single lender. For even the largest funds, some of these
projects could constitute more than 10% of their property
portfolio, invoking a level of risk which would be
unacceptable for a single investment. The decline in
1 Jones, Lang, Wooton.
2 Hillier Parker.
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institutional allocations to property aggravates this
funding gap. While in 1980 property accounted for an aver-
age of 22% of institutional holdings, in 1985 the figure was
down to 12%.1 Table 2 shows the top five pension funds in
terms of assets. An investment in a single project of more
than L84m by the largest fund, the National Coal Board,
would exceed 10% of its property portfolio, assuming 12% of
its holding is in property. Traditional financing
resources, therefore, are no longer adequate to fully fund
the rising development costs of buildings called for by
tenants and consumers.
Table 2 : Five Largest Pension Funds in the UK 1986
Fund Assets (LOOO,000)
1. National Coal Board 7000
2. British Telecom 6100
3. Electic Supply 4400
4. Post Office 4250
5. British Rail 4000
Source : A. P. Financial Registers
However, the compostition of the investor market has
dramatically changed since the 70's. Changes in the
1 A. P. Financial Registers.
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patterns of employment favoring smaller firms and the grow-
ing importance of individually held pension policies has
resulted in a growing number of smaller schemes. 1  The
rising number is evidenced by the 43% increase since 1982 in
unit trust assets, which is the primary investment vehicle
for smaller funds.2 They typically maintain a lower per-
centage of their portfolios in direct property investment
because any single investment can account for a greater
proportion of invested funds, thus preventing the fund from
adequately diversifying property interests. Most of the
smaller funds' property investment, therefore, is indirect
via property unit trusts. While the large institutional
funds still dominate the market in terms of assets, the
smaller funds have emerged as an alternative funding source.
The private investor has also emerged as a source of
development capital. This is evidenced by the advent of
successful new investment vehicles aimed at the private
investor, such as residential property bonds and property
enterprise trusts. (See Appendix A.) Furthermore, the pri-
mary investment sector for the individual, ie residential,
has witnessed values climbing faster than inflation for the
last five years.3 The private sector, therefore, holds a
1 Jones, Lang, Wooton.
2 Financial Statistics.
3 Hillier Parker.
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vast source of wealth which if properly catered to, could
prove a significant source of development funding for large
capital requiring schemes.
-26-
III. The Investment Pool
Since no single source is typically capable of funding
today's large projects, the market needs to pool together
the financial resources available from the institutions, the
smaller funds, as well as the individual to fund the large
scale projects. The mechanism by which the funds are pooled
should have more attractive characteristics than alternative
investment vehicles, otherwise capital will not flow into
the pool.
The illiquidity of property has long been viewed as it's
primary investment disadvantage. Consequently, the pool
should provide a means of quick and easy transfer of
investors' interests. Liquidity would allow investors to
respond to the changing nature of the markets and would
reduce the long term nature of risk inherent in a property
investment. For this reason, if a liquid property
investment vehicle is introduced, institutions may allot a
higher percentage of funds to property investment. In
addition, individuals, whose presence in the debt and equity
market is strongly felt in turnover, favor investment
markets in which they can easily buy and sell their
holdings.
The vehicle should also provide for the divisibility of
property into smaller lot sizes. Because of the large
-27-
amounts of capital required for property investments, many
investors, both individuals and funds, are precluded from
direct investments simply because they cannot afford them.
By reducing the lot size and hence the capital required for
an investment in property, the market would be attractive to
more investors. Smaller unit sizes would also enhance the
liquidity, of the investment. Funds would be able to
effectively achieve their portfolio percentage targets,
since large amounts of capital which could tip their
portfolios wouldn't be required for investment. They could
also diversify their portfolio to a greater extent, thereby
spreading risk. Smaller unit sizes would also enhance their
liquidity. These factors could work to bring additional
capital into in the property market.
The tax implications are also of considerable importance
in attracting funds into the pool. If the vehicle was more
tax efficient than alternative investments, funds would also
flow into the pool. Pension funds are tax exempt;
therefore, while they would be indifferent to the tax
consequences of a unitholder, they would be concerned about
the tax implications of the vehicle itself. Other investors
would investigate the tax liabilities to both the unitholder
and the vehicle.
The vehicle for pooling capital can take the form of
either a debt obligation or the issuance of equity in a com-
-28-
pany or development project. The following section reviews
the possibilities for pooling via an ownership vehicle.
-29-
IV. Multiple Ownership
Equity ownership of property can take several forms, as
follows;
1. Direct Property Ownership,
2. Partnership Ownership,
3. Corporate Ownership,
4. Property Unit Trusts,
5. Unitization Proposals.
Direct Property Ownership
Direct property ownership entitles the land owner, or
the building owner in the case of a land lease, to all the
rights associated with the asset. Taxes are paid by the
property owner on any income generated by the asset, as well
as on any capital gain arising from the sale of the
property.
If the property is owned by more that one person,
according to the Law of Property Act of 1925, it must be
held in a trust for sale. Beneficiaries of the trust would
be entitled to their share of profits and losses, which in
turn would be subject to tax. Title to the property cannot
be vested in more than 4 trustees. By the doctrine of the
trust for sale, each trustee has a duty to sell the property
but the power to postpone sale. Since the trust can be
-30-
enforced by any interested party, sale of the property could
unexpectedly occur unless all the trustees agree to postpone
the sale. Although in practice this uncertainty of sale is
not considered a handicap, it is a legally binding aspect of
direct co-ownership.
Partnership Ownership
According to the Partnership Act of 1890, a partnership
is a relationship which exists between two or more persons
with the view of making profit, but who are not incorpor-
ated. While the partnership holds legal title to the prop-
erty, each partner is entitled to his pro rata share of
profits and gains. However, the divisibility of these
rights is again limited. According to the Companies Act
1985, it is "illegal to form a partnership of more than 20
persons which has for its object the acquisition of gain."
Any such venture would have to be incorporated under the
Companies Act.
Although partnerships are tax transparent, ie income and
capital gains are taxable only to the partners themselves,
they could pose a slight tax disadvantage to direct
ownership. Tax assessments are based on the current tax
year's pro rata distribution percentages, even if the
current year's percentages were not actually used when the
previous years profits were distributed. If a partner's
percentage share of income increases during the year, he
-31-
would be liable for tax on income he did not actually
receive the prior year.
Another offsetting feature of partnership vehicle is the
full responsibilty placed on each partner in the case of
defaults by any other partner. Only limited partners are
released of this duty; however, they are liable to the
extent of their capital invested. Furthermore, by
definition, a limited partner can assume no control over the
day to day management of the property. For this reason,
limited partnerships are often unacceptable to the
sophisticated institutional investor, who views management
as critical to the property's performance and may insist on
management participation.
Corporate Ownership
Investment in the equity of a publicly traded property
company shares is another means of property ownership.
Title to the property is held by a company, which in turn is
owned by its shareholders. As an indirect form of ownership,
shareholders are entitled to the income generated by the
property as defined by the board of directors through the
declaration of dividends.
Typically, a shareholder of a property company invests
in various buildings depending on the portfolio of the
company. The company's portfolio is managed by the
-32-
executives, who may alter the compostition of the portfolio
at any time. Therefore, an investment in a property company
is evaluated not only in terms of the property it owns, but
also in terms of the company's management ability.
Single asset property companies, or SAPPCOs, are also
available, as equity investment vehicles in property.
Billingsgate City Securities plc, which recently offered
debt and equity instruments to the public, is an example of
a SAPPCO. Investors in SAPPCO's rely solely on the
performance of a particular building, which in the case of
Billingsgate City Securities is a 185,000 sf office building
let to Samuel Montagu plc. SAPPCO's do not offer the
diversity, or spread of risk, that property companies can
provide; an investment in one building with possibly a
single tenant involves more risk than an investment in
various properties with multiple tenants. However, because
SAPPCOs are evaluated only on the growth and income
potential of one property, they allow for more thorough
analysis than a diversified property company.
Companies are recognized in UK tax legislation as legal
personnae and as such are charged a corporate tax rate on
income and capital gains. Shareholders are also taxed on
income from dividends and any capital gain on the disposal
of their shares. Therefore, the investor in a property
company suffers double taxation. Assuming a 35% corporate
-33-
tax rate, the penalty of passing income through a corporate
entity is effectively 8.45% of distributed income. (See
Appendix B for tax treatment of dividends).
Property Unit Trusts (PUTs)
PUTs are open ended pooled funds which offer investors
an interest in a diversified portfolio of property. The
portfolio is managed by the trustees, and like that of the
property company, its composition can change over time.
Because the Department of Trade and Industry has refused
to authorise trusts investing in property, PUTs exist in
"unauthorised" form only and therfore, carry with them
certain marketing and fiscal disadvantages. It is illegal
to distribute knowingly, without permission of the DTI, any
documents which contain an offer to acquire any units in an
unauthorised unit trust. The major exception to this rule
is for schemes formed exclusively for investment by pension
funds and charities, the "gross funds". Therefore, because
they cannot be marketed directly to the general public, most
PUTs are available only to the gross funds.
There are also tax disadvantages for unauthorised
trusts. Management expenses cannot be deducted when comput-
ing trust income. Furthermore, for capital gain tax pur-
poses, the trust is treated like a company and is liable for
tax at the full company rate. Unitholders are also liable
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for capital gains tax on disposal of their interest in the
trust, although most investors in PUTs are tax exempt pen-
sion funds and charities.
Since most PUTs have only small borrowings, the value
of the units closely reflect the value of the underlying
assets. ,However, because the trustees are obligated to
redeem the value of the units upon request from a unit-
holder, the assets are not most efficiently invested. The
trustees must keep a small percentage of the trust assets in
the form of cash or liquid assets to meet redemption
requirements. If many unitholders demand redemption, the
trustees may be forced to sell some of the trust assets.
Therefore, the optimal use of trust assets is prevented by
the liquidity of the units.
Unitization
Currently, the industry is also debating the viability
of two proposed methods of multiple ownership, or unitiza-
tion. The first is backed by the Royal Institute of Char-
tered Surveyors and is characterized as a Single Property
Trust (SPT). The second, developed by Richard Ellis and
County Bank, is known as the Property Income Certificate
(PINC).
The SPT is similar to the Real Estate Investment Trust
concept in the US. The trust would acquire a single build-
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ing, with legal title vested with the trustee but all bene-
fits of title would accrue to the beneficiaries, ie the uni-
tholders. The trust deed would provide for the appointment
of property managers, and would specify the rights of the
unitholders. The RICS hopes to obtain DTI approval so that
the SPT would be an authorized trust exempt under the
Finance Act of 1980 from capital gains tax on investments
sold by it. An amendment to the Finance Act of 1980 would
also be required so that ordinary income would be taxbleonly
to the unitholder. If the DTI authorizes the trust, the
units could be marketed to the general public. The number of
investors would not be restricted by law, but the trust
would be closed ended with the proceeds used to acquire one
property.
The PINCs proposal, on the other hand, would be an
investment security having two inseparable parts; an income
certificate which would entitle the holder to a share of
rental income by right of contract, and an ordinary share in
the management company specifically created for the
property. Unlike the SPT, the PINC would require no change
in existing law. According to Richard Ellis, rental income
less management charges and withholding tax would be passed
directly to unitholder and subject to tax according to the
applicable personal rate. 1 The owner of the building will
1 Richard Ellis/County Bank.
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have the right to decide what percentage of equity in the
building will be floated. Although the freehold interest
would remain with the owner, the sponsors expect that since
the value of the property will be determined by the market
over time, the freehold interest will assume only a nominal
value.1  The management company will have a Board of
Directors appointed by the shareholders, ie the owner and
the PINCs investors. If the owner retains more than a 50%
interest in the property, he will control the management of
the property. The vehicle is not designed for the small
investor, since the unit cost on flotation is expected to be
a minimum of L20,000.
Although it is not a revolutionary concept, the single
property trust has not been implemented in the past because
of legal restrictions. The RICS is now lobbying to change
the law to provide for the trust vehicle, but at this point
the passage of the necessary changes in the law is
uncertain. The PINCs concept, however, does not require any
changes to existing law, nor does it take advantage of
recent amendments or "loopholes." It's complexity probably
explains why it has not been devised before. PINCs relies
on the law of contracts instead of the rights of property
title. In essence, it is composed of two distinct
instruments which, although inseparable, carry with them
1 Richard Ellis/County Bank.
-37-
different rights and obligations. The investor must concep-
tually understand both instruments, as well as the
implications of their combination.
Both proposed schemes have inherent problems which need
to be addressed. Both schemes promote majority ownership of
units, since control of the building's management will
ultimately rest with the largest unitholder. However,
frequent shifting of majority interests could result in
frequent replacement of the property manager. Long term
management of the property would be replaced by short term
decisions, which could work against the efficient use of the
property.
With the appointment of the management company either
indirectly controlled by the SPT unitholders, or in the case
of PINCs directly owned, a conflict of interest may arise
for the managers. Market demand for the units, and hence the
units' trading price, will largely result from annual or
quarterly information about the underlying property, such as
pro formas, rent reviews and lease renewals. This
information would be furnished by the property managers.
However, the unitholders will be inclined to replace property
managers when their investment is not performing up to par,
ie if the units are not returning an adequate yield.
Therefore, it would be in the property managers best interest
to provide only optimistic information on the property in
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order to boost the units' performance and retain investor
confidence.
Capital outlay decisions which could enhance the long
term value of the property, such as refurbishments or the
purchase of adjacent properties, would be decided by
majority vote of the unitholders. However, the majority of
the unitholders, perhaps naive as to the management of
property, may not understand the long term consequences of
these decisions. Therefore, necessary and advantageous
expenditures may be avoided. This is particularly probable
with the SPT in which the general public participates.
The funding of major capital expenditures could also
present problems. The RICS and Richard Ellis both propose
the issuance of stock with rights of first refusal to the
existing shareholders to cover refurbishment or redevelopment
costs. However, these decisions must be authorized by the
shareholders themselves, who would be confronted with either
dilution or additional personal capital commitments should
they decide in favor of the expenditure. Furthermore,
additional capital expenditures on a property with a stable
income stream will lower the return on their investment. In
the long run, rental income would rise to account for the
expenditure. But in the short term share value may fall,
again to the detriment of the shareholder. Therefore, while
the capital expenditure may be beneficial for the long term
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value of the property, it would not be advantageous to those
who would decide whether to make it.
The possibility of fraudulent trading in the units would
also exist. The price of the shares would largely be a
function of the income capacity of the underlying building.
Changes in rental income would be a function of periodic
rent reviews. The price of the shares, therefore, would
largely depend on the outcome of the review. Significant
gains or losses could be made once the market receives the
information. This opens the door for insider trading. With
a wide range of parties having access to the information
before it becomes public, ie the leasor, the valuer, the
manager, a supervisory body would have a difficult task in
controlling the fraud.
Even if the aforementioned problems with SPTs and PINCs
are sorted out by their respective sponsors and the vehicles
are introduced to the marketplace, there is no guarantee of
their success. Both unitization concepts are new to the
investor, so there are no predecessors with which to judge
their viability. However, the unitized vehicle can be evalu-
ated in terms of the benefits and disadvantages it will have
to other investments available to the different groups of
investors.
A unitized vehicle would allow the large insitutions to
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partially dispose of buildings which are tying up large
amounts of capital. The freed funds would most likely flow
back into the property market as the institutions maintain
their portfolio allotments. Since unitization promotes
majority ownership, the secondary market in units will offer
the institutions only minority stakes in various unitized
properties. However, the large institutional funds are
reluctant to invest in minority ownership of property.
Management control over their property investments is a
primary investment criteria for the large funds. Therefore,
the institution's free funds will probably be directed
toward majority ownership or development, not the unitized
property market which will most likely offer only minority
interests in the secondary market.
Institutions tend to hold their property investments for
extended periods, as shown in Table 2. Although the
turnover ratio in 1983 was the highest in the period shown
reflecting more active portfolio management by the funds,
only 3% of total property holdings were sold. The
institutions, therefore, are unlikely to relinquish majority
control of theri investments over much of the useful life of
the property. Without the majority of the shares being
actively traded, the liquidity of the investment could be
hindered.
With regard to the smaller funds, investments in
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unitized properties would require them to diversify their
portfolios internally. Traditionally, diversification of
property holdings was left to the property unit trust in
Table 2: Turnover Ratios (Disposals As Percentage of Assets)
Property Gov't Company
Securities Securities
Insurance Companies
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Pension Funds
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Source:
2.6
1.5
1.6
2.2
3.1
1.7
1.5
1.8
1.7
3.2
Debenham,
90.4
79.2
80.1
86.3
76.2
81.2
48.2
45.5
70.7
56.4
Tewson &
10.7
14.3
15.1
17.5
20.1
13.2
11.0
14.2
18.3
22.5
Chinnocks
which they participated. As a result, the small fund may not
have the internal expertise to adequately diversify a
unitized portfolio. They may prefer the PUT vehicle instead
of multiple unitized property investments.
Although the liquidity offered by a PUT can work to the
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funds' disadvantage, the unitized market would not be
attractive to the small fund until its liquidity was proven.
Without liquidity, there will be no incentive for the fund
to change their investment patterns and invest in SPTs or
PINCs. While the sponsors of the unitized market claim that
the small funds would be able to invest in properties which
they would not otherwise be able to own, there are no
guarantees that unique, high yielding investments will be
offered by unitization. The high- performing buildings that
large institutions presently control are not likely to be
unitized, since the funds will want to retain the benefits.
The institutions will instead be inclined to divest the
under- performing properties in their portfolio, in spite of
the fact that some type of regulatory authority may control
the type of properties unitized. The new development
schemes of today will be prime candidates for unitization.
While these large schemes presently sell at discounts
due to their size and limited marketability, once
unitization is introduced this discount will disappear, thus
bringing the yield on the large developments down to the
level of other property investments. The return will, of
course, depend on the particular characteristics of the
property. But the PUT investment will still be very
competitive with an SPT or PINC.
Since the small fund cannot be relied upon to generate
liquidity, and the large institutions are not likely to
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actively buy and sell shares, the individual investors'
participation will be critical in creating a liquid and
viable unitized market.
In order to attract the individual investor, the
unitized market will need to provide more benefits than the
individual's primary investment alternative, ie shares in
property companies. Ownership of shares is an established,
familiar
ownership
management
ownership
ownership
obligatior
companies
appointed
ownership
vehicle for the individual which offers indirect
of various properties, in addition to skilled
While unitization would provide a direct
vehicle, individuals are unfamiliar with the
of commercial properties and all the rights and
s thereof. The directors of the property
are assumed to understand these concepts and are
by the shareholders to maximize the benefits of
and satisfy all obligations. Direct ownership may
not be attractive because it would require the individual to
understand the specifics of managing the underlying
property. They may prefer to accept the 8% tax penalty for
investing through a company structure, and leave these
responsibilities in the hands of the directors.
Liquidity is also offered through property company
shares. In comparison, the unitized market will rely on the
private investors' participation before liquidity will be
generated. But in light of the property disaster of the
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70s, the individual will be cautious towards a new property
investment vehicle. Given the choice between an established
liquid market and a market in which liquidity is still in
doubt, the investor is likely to chose the former.
Therefore, the unitized property market will need to
demonstrate clear advantages before the private investor
will partake. Without the individual, however, it is
unlikely that the market will be able to establish itself.
This will lead to a Catch 22 situation.
The property investment companies themselves are another
class of potential investors in unitized properties.
Unitization would allow them to hold portions of the larger
projects they develop, further diversifying their portfolio
and spreading risk. Like the large institutional investor,
however, they are likely to retain majority ownership of the
property in order to control its management. Furthermore, as
they diversify their holdings, property company shares could
become even more attractive to the private investor, thus
further detracting private investment in unitized property.
Property company investment could hinder liquidity for units
more than it would help.
Multiple ownership of single properties does not seem to
be the answer to the funding gap. The traditional vehicles
for multiple ownership are inadequate to broaden the base of
investor participation in the property market. The methods
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of unitization proposed are impounded by legal restrictions,
but even if these restrictions were relaxed, investors'
attitudes would not support such a property market. The
investment substitutes available to the critical support
group, ie the individual, are simply more attractive than an
investment in a single property.
Furthermore, as previously determined, equity capital
provided for new construction is lower in periods when
returns on alternative investments outperform the returns on
property and when real interest rates are high. Currently,
gilts and equities offer higher investment returns than
property, and real interest rates are extremely high levels.
Therefore, suppliers of capital are likely to finance new
development with debt. A new equity vehicle seems inappro-
priate at this time. Instead, debt instruments should be
investigated and refined. The next section examines debt
alternatives readily available in the marketplace.
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V. The Securitized Debt Market.
As an alternative to equity ownership, investors can
partake in property market debt issues. The debt market
offers a wide range of instruments, allowing the investor to
chose the form of debt which best suits his/her investment
criteria. The issuer, in turn, can structure debt in various
fashions to meet particular funding needs. The debt markets
are appealing to the issuer because full equity interest in
the property can be retained. In theory, leverage maximizes
the potential for growth and returns to the owner. In the
case of a public property company, these benefits would
accrue to the shareholder.
Debt financing for property has many advantages over
multiple ownership. While the proposals for unitization call
for changes in the law, various debt alternatives are
available within existing legal boundaries. Most debt issues
can be offered to any number of investors in any lot size.
The marketability of debt instruments is generally not
restricted, so a broad range of investors can participate.
Furthermore, although the liquidity of a particular debt
instrument cannot be guaranteed, the secondary market for
debt is well established and familiar to the investing
public.
While equity instruments for the private investor are
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doubly taxed, debt does not require a taxed intermediary.
Interest on debt is taxed as income only to the unitholder.
At the same time, interest on debt can be deducted by the
issuer for tax and accounting purposes.
Since debt has priority recourse over shareholders
in the event of liquidation of the company, it is considered
a safer investment. The payment of interest and principal is
usually secured by the assets of the the company. However, if
the property company wanted to minimize their liability and
protect their portfolio assets, they could establish a wholly
owned SAPPCO, in which case secured financing would only
provide for recourse to the building alone. In either case,
equity interest in the property would remain with the issuer,
ie property company.
Investors attraction to property debt instruments was
demonstrated by the Safeway Loan Stock issue and the recent
Billingsgate Securities offering. Launched in October 1985,
the Safeway issue was the first deep discount sterling issue
aimed at the UK market. The issue margin of 90 basis points
over the 131/2 Treasury Stock 2004/08, the benchmark long
term gilt, was the lowest achieved at that time by a private
issuer. The Billingsgate deep discount issue successfully
closed at 115 basis points over the long term gilt, a low
margin considering the issue was backed by a SAPPCO. Since
traditional long term financing is usually priced anywhere
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between 200 and 300 basis points above the benchmark gilt,
these low margins also imply that developers can substan-
tially reduce their financing costs by directly accessing
the debt market.
The most common types of debt are the traditional bonds,
the convertible, the participating, and the deep discount.
The traditional bond entitles the holder to periodic payments
of interest and/or principal at some contractually guaranteed
rate of interest. Interest can be fixed, or vary according
to some predetermined indicator, eg Libor. The bond can be
secured by the assets of the company, but unsecured debt is
also common. Normally the latter will provide a higher
return to compensate the investor for the added risk.
The participating mortgage provides for investor
participation in future earnings and/or gains upon
disposal of the property. Typically income has to exceed a
certain level before participation commences. On the
downside, the investor is guaranteed a periodic payment,
regardless of the income generated by the property. Since
the investor can share in future profits, the rate of
interest is generally lower than the traditional bond. This
provides the issuer with cheaper upfront capital at the cost
of reducing his potential future yield.
Convertible bonds entitle holders to convert their debt
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interest into equity ownership in the future at a fixed
conversion rate. With the expectation of future gain upon
conversion, investors are often willing to accept a lower
rate of interest than the traditional bond. The main
disadvantage of convertibles to the issuing company is that
although the issuer will have lower initial capital
requirements to support the debt, the conversion will dilute
shareholders interest in the company. However, if the
underlying equity is not attractive to the investor during
the conversion period, the exchange will not occur, leaving
the issuer with lower cost financing.
Although deep discount bonds have been legal forms of
financing since 1982, it was not until the government
clarified their tax treatment in the 1984 Finance Act that
deep discount bonds became an attractive source of financing.
A bond is deemed to be deep discount if the issue price is
less than 85% of the amount payable upon redemption or if the
discount exceeds .5% per annum over the number of years
between the date of issue and the redemption date. It's
obligations are much like those of the traditional bond. The
critical distinction lies in the tax treatment of the bond.
While the investor is liable for tax on the bond coupon, the
issuer can deduct the interest paid as well as a portion of
the issue discount. For example, the Safeway bond had a
coupon of 3% in the first five years on L100m nominal. The
yield to maturity was 11.25%, thus raising roughly L40M for
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the company. For tax and accounting purposes, Safeway could
deduct L4.5m (L40m x 11.25%), although they only paid
interest of L3m. The Ll.5m difference is the amortized
portion of the L60m discount. The L4.5m expense leads to a
tax deduction of L1.575m at a 35% tax rate, and an after tax
cost of only L1.425m. At the same time, most investors are
only liable for tax on the L3m interest paid, not the annual
accrual of the discount. Investors are liable for tax on
the discount only upon disposal or redemption of the bond.
Although this accrual is taxed as income, the deferral
results in significant tax advantages over the traditional
bond.
While debt has it's many attractions, the market is not
free of disadvantages. Debt is a obligation which must be
fulfilled regardless of the income performance of the
underlying properties. If property income does not meet
expectations, the company may encounter liquidity problems
with its debt obligations. A cash drain could hinder future
property developments or necessitate a reduction in
dividend. It could also force the company to liquidate some
of its assets.
The cost of debt is largely a function of economic
conditions and is priced in relation to yields on Treasury
stock. In periods of high interest rates, new debt may be
very expensive compared to other capital financing
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alternatives. At the same time, in periods of low interest
rates, a company can lock into a low rate of financing.
However, investors generally seek short term or variable
rate debt instruments in periods of low rates with the
expectation that rates will rise in the future. Short term
debt to be refinanced in the future, as well as variable
rate debt, exposes the issuer to unfavorable changes in
interest rates and rising capital costs.
Although the debt may be secured by the assets of the
issuing company, investors generally will not accept a loan
to value ratio greater than 60 - 65%. This margin protects
the investor from a drop in the market value of their
collateral. However, the developer of a scheme who wishes to
add the building to his portfolio needs only to recoup his
costs. If the cost to market value ratio is less than 60 -
65%, the developer can finance the project entirely with a
carefully structured debt issue against the building via a
SAPPCO.
If the costs of the project exceeded that which could be
raised via debt, or if the property company wishes to acquire
a building developed externally, a debt issue against the
building itself will not cover 100% of the costs. The
remaining costs can be financed in various ways without
diluting equity ownership. Firstly, the development company
can realize it's own portfolio appreciation by issuing debt
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against the increase in market value of its assets. A second
mortgage would provide capital which otherwise would not
become available until the asset was sold.
The developer could also issue warrants for debt which
would enable the investor to buy at a predetermined cost a
specific issue of debt to be placed on a future conversion
date. The developer would collect the proceeds of the
warrants, but cash outlay would not be required until the
debt was actually issued. This form of financing gears the
expected future appreciation of the property. If interest
rates rise, the bonds will not be attractive to investors and
they will let the warrants expire. The developer gets the
warrant premium without any associated costs. Although the
new debt issue could prove expensive if interest rates fall,
the benefit of upfront interest free capital may outweigh the
added cost in the future.
By decreasing the risk of a debt issue in the eyes of
the investor, the developer could boost his loan to value
ratio and raise more capital on the offering. A well
recognized standard of risk measurement is a credit agency
debt rating. Standard & Poor's now commonly rates properties
for their ability to generate lease income to meet specific
debt obligations. A strong S & P rating stands on its own
as a sign of a safe investment, and is enough to attract
investors who otherwise might not have invested in property.
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Among other things, S & P analyzes the lease terms, tenant
strength, and quality of the building's construction. Since
investors in SAPPCO's only have recourse in a particular
building, they are particularly interested in that property's
ability to provide for the debt payments. An excellent
rating by S & P is viewed as a sound investment, and
therefore could significantly reduce the cost of capital,
and/or increase the amount which might be raised.
Since S & P rates the security of the bond obligations,
the developer could maximize investor protection by obtaining
insurance for the lease payments. The insurer would agree to
assume the lease obligations if the tenant defaulted for any
reason, thus significantly reducing the risk of investing in
a debt instrument on the property. S & P recognizes that
insurance minimizes the investor's exposure, and is often
willing to award a higher rating on the debt. The cost of
the insurance would have to be evaluated against the
projected reduction in interest which could result from a
higher rating to determine its potential benefit.
If any costs remained to be funded, the company could
turn to its own capital resources, which for most
development companies is in short supply. With perhaps 60 -
65% of costs covered through a debt instrument, the
developer would need additional capital of 35 - 40% total
project costs, assuming he seeks 100% financing. The
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developer has two alternatives at this stage. He can
structure a secondary mortgage with a higher yield.
However, as a higher risk instrument, the range of investors
would be limited. A secondary mortgage may also prove too
expensive to the developer in light of the higher interest
rate the secondary mortgage would bear.
Secondly, he can turn back to a shared ownership scheme
with the institutional funds or venture capital interests.
Without any capital at stake in the project, it may be
difficult to maintain majority interest in the project.
Those providing the needed funds may claim that they are
assuming most of the financial risk in the project and want
to be compensated accordingly. However, if the debt was
recourse to the developer, then the developer would assume
most of the project risk. In this case, the funder should
be entitled to a only proportional share of growth and
income equal to the percentage of the total project costs,
giving the developer the majority of benefits from the
project.
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VI. Conclusion
Is the funding gap a temporary phenomena, one that
will disappear once the yields on property investments
outpace those on other investments? Historically, capital
flowing into property investment was strongest when property
prices were driven down by weak investment demand or when
strong occupational demand pushed rental growth steeply
upwards. Is the cry for alternative funding merely echoing
the developers' need for cash at a time when property is
simply not an attractive investment compared to gilts or
equities?
While higher allotments from the institutions can be
anticipated when, and if, the margin between property yields
and yields on gilts or equities narrows, it cannot be
expected that institutional funds alone will be able fund
the large office and retail projects demanded by todays
workforce and consumer. The financing required by these
huge schemes will not allow a single lender to adequately
diversify his portfolio. As a result, it may be imprudent
for even the largest institution to fund this type of
project.
The large non-financial institutions and banks, however,
are no longer the only financiers for the developer. The
private investor has started to play the development game,
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and could prove a significant source of funds for the
property market. As a distinct class of investors, the
individuals' investment criteria differs from that of the
institutions. The individual does not have vast resources
of the funds, and is generally a shorter term investor than
large fund. The property market, therefore, needs to alter
the nature of property as an expensive and illiquid
investment in order to tap this source of funds.
The proposals for unitization and multiple property
ownership seek to address these needs by introducing smaller
lot sizes and liquidity for large schemes. However, the
ability of a unitized market to generate sufficient
liquidity to attract the individual is questionable. The
individual must be an active participant in the unitized
market in order to generate liquidity in the shares. But as
a new property investment vehicle, it is unlikely that he
will partake until liquidity is proven because his
alternative property investment, ie shares in property
companies, adequately suits his needs as an established,
liquid market.
Furthermore, historical investment patterns indicate
that investors tend to increase their investment in debt
instruments when faced with property yields and real inter-
est rates such as those prevalent today. Developers should
look to the traditional methods of corporate debt financing
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and apply these concepts to property. Debt is an estab-
lished investment market, and offers a wide range of funding
options to the developer. Long term financing at signifi-
cant interest rate savings can be structured to suit the
developer, with the benefits of a high yielding, liquid
asset accruing to the investor.
The attractiveness of debt over multiple ownership was
highlighted by the owner/developers of the Canary Wharf
scheme, who claimed at a recent property market conference
that they would prefer securitization over unitization to
finance their L1.5b scheme. 1 Their sentiment is probably
echoed by many owners of schemes which otherwise would be
prime candidates for unitization simply because the unitized
market can only succeed with projects that are so promising
that everyone wants to own them. The promising projects,
however, attract investors and are the easier ones to float
debt against. By issuing debt, the owner/developer can
maintain a full equity position in the project, and receive
all the benefits thereof. Not that developers are stingy,
but after all, they are not known to be pass up a sure bet.
1 J. Scott Lowry, Director Canary Wharf Development Company
Ltd. speaking at Profex Conference on Development, Invest-
ment and Finance After the Big Bang.
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APPENDIX A
Property Investment Vehicles Aimed at the Private Investor.
Residential Property Bonds.
This investment bond is essentially a single premium
life insurance policy which can be increased or withdrawn at
any time. The units range in size from L50 to L1,000,
although minimum investment is usually L1,000. After ini-
tial subscription, the price of the units is determined by
the value of the underlying fund. Units can be cashed by
selling them back to the fund, although the funds usually
reserve the right to defer payment. Tax is charged on any
profit realized when the units are cashed.
Property Enterprise Trusts.
PETs are designed to take advantage of the industrial
building allowances available in Enterprise zones. Estab-
lished in the form of unauthorized unit trusts, PETs are
permitted by the DTI to distribute promotional material to
the general public provided they invest in three or more
properties. The trust purchases qualified properties in
Enterprise zones with the subscription funds received. The
allowances which can be claimed for 100% of capital
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expenditures on qualified buildings in the Enterprise zones
are proportionally split between each beneficial investor in
the trust. These allowances can then be used to offset other
income in the year of assessment. However, the income on
which tax relief was claimed will be subject to a charge if
the shares are disposed of within 25 years. Minimum
investmentis L5,000, with L1,000 unit increments, and
redemption is not guaranteed by the promoters.
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APPENDIX B
Tax Treatment of Corporate Dividends.
While shareholders are subject to income tax on
dividends, UK tax legislation provides partial relief from
double taxation in the form of tax credits. The Finance
Act of 1970 provides that shareholders may claim as credit a
portion of the tax paid at the corporate level on dividends.
In 1986, this rate is 29/71 of the distributed dividends.
The investor would then pay personal rates on the net
dividend after credit.
Assume taxable income of company =
Tax @ 35%
Distributable income
Associated tax credit
(29/71 x distribution)
Net dividend
100
35
65
26.55
91.55
Therefore, the tax cost of passing income through a
corporate entity is 8.45%.
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APPENDIX C
A Note on Property Indexes in the UK:
It is important to note that property returns cannot be
effectively measured because of the lack of real open market
valuations for property in the UK. The indexes published by
the various sponsors of market data, ie Jones, Lang, Wooton;
Richard Ellis, etc., are calculated by dividing the increase
in capital value during the period plus rental income by the
value of the property. Since the increase in capital value
in any period is based on valuations performed typically by
the same sponsor, the actual returns are clouded by the
assumptions used in the valuing. The value assigned to a
property is not necessarily the value that would be realized
if the property was sold. Unfortunately, there is no way of
obtaining a true open market valuation because property
does not actively change hands. Even the value of Property
Unit Trust units is determined by third party valuation, not
through an investor pricing mechanism. This contrasts to
capital' indexes in the United States, where capital values
can easily be determined by the value of traded Real Estate
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Investment Trust units. Therefore, while valuation-based
indices in the UK may be indicative, they are not
definitive.
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